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A Two Stage Stochastic Mechanism for Selling Random Power
Nathan Dahlin and Rahul Jain
Abstract—We present a two stage auction mechanism that
renewable generators (or aggregators) could use to allocate
renewable energy among LSEs. The auction is conducted day-
ahead. LSEs submit bids specifying their valuation per unit, as
well as their real-time fulfillment costs in case of shortfall in
generation. We present an allocation rule and a de-allocation
rule that maximizes expected social welfare. Since the LSEs
are strategic and may not report their private valuations and
costs truthfully, we design a two-part payment, one made in
Stage 1, before renewable energy generation level W is realized,
and another determined later to be paid as compensation to
those LSEs that have to be “de-allocated” in case of a shortfall.
We proposes a two-stage Stochastic VCG mechanism which we
prove is incentive compatible in expectation (expected payoff
maximizing bidders will bid truthfully), individually rational in
expectation (expected payoff of all participants is non-negative)
and is also efficient. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first such two-stage mechanism for selling random goods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Remarkable strides have been made in meeting the aggres-
sive renewable energy portofolio standards worldwide. For
example, California has gone from under 5% of energy from
renewable sources in 2010 to nearly 25% today and expected
to reach 33% in 2020. In fact, the state has mandated
100% of energy to be derived from renewable sources by
2045. Other states and countries are following suit [6]. This
presents immense technological and economic challenges.
Renewable energy sources such as wind and solar are
inherently variable, meaning that efforts to bridge such
gaps must address the challenge of efficiently mitigating
the impact of uncertainty in generation. For some time,
renewable resources have been considered more akin to
negative loads than firm block generating units, and their
growth has been spurred by feed-in tariffs [1], [5]. In order
to maintain grid stability, it is the responsibility of an inde-
pendent system operator (ISO) to procure adequate reserves
to compensate for potential shortfalls in generation. While
feasible at relatively low levels of usage, at higher levels
of penetration such arrangements hamper the net benefits of
renewable energy [2]. Therefore, prevailing approaches to
renewable integration have shifted from so called supply-
push-type mechanisms [1] to those which place more of the
burden on the generators themselves as well as their end
users.
This shift has manifested in a couple of ways, first via
what can be categorized as technological regulations. For
example in Spain, both new and existing generators are
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required to equip themselves with fault-ride-through capa-
bility. Secondly, economic regulations have evolved such
that generators are more directly exposed to the risks as-
sociated with their variability. Again turning to the Spanish
example, mandatory hourly forecasting requirements were
implemented along with penalties of 10% estimated system
cost for deviations of over 20%.
This example typifies two-settlement systems: renewable
generators are forced to participate in conventional energy
markets with ex-post monetary penalties for deviations from
ex-ante contracts. The latter are settled in day-ahead (DA)
markets, while the former are determined in real-time (RT)
spot markets. Formally, the determination of committed
quantities and allocations can be captured in the framework
of optimization problems [9].
Adopting the view of wind or solar energy as a random
good, much work has focused on how the manner in which
generators bring their product to market can affect social
welfare. In [10] and [2], given the probability distribution of
power generation scenarios, contracts of the form (ρk, pk),
signifying a price of pk per unit of the contract, which will
be fulfilled with probability ρk, must be designed. Thus,
Load serving entitities (LSEs) are given an opportunity on
how much risk due to insufficient generation they need to
take on, given the variable-reliability options presented by
the supplier. Such a market is shown in [2] to operate
more efficiently than a firm-electricity market, which incurs
additional costs including the provisioning of reserves. In
[3] the problem is to set a price p and offered generation
quantity C in order to maximize expected profit, rather than
social welfare. Still it is shown that the optimal expected
shortfall is nondecreasing in p and C, demonstrating the need
to curtail offerings to reduce necessary reserve capacities.
The studies above assume that the distribution used in
determining optimal offerings is reported truthfully. [11]
investigates the aggregator’s task of selecting a subset of
available generators to maximize a given objective (e.g.
maximize expected generation) as well as the ISO’s problem
of pricing wind energy, given a set of available generators,
allowing for strategic behavior by generators in reporting
their generation distributions. A stochastic VCG mechanism,
as well as a commitment with penalty type mechanism are
proposed which elicit truthful distribution reporting, i.e., in-
centive compatibility, satisfy generator individual rationality
(or voluntary participation) constraints and achieve efficient
outcomes.
In this paper, we examine the situation wherein a renew-
able generator, or an aggregator allocates generated elec-
tricity among a set of LSEs via an auction mechanism.
We design a two stage auction. In Stage 1 (day ahead),
the LSEs make bids that specify their value v for each
unit. Furthermore, they also specify their cost c of real-time
fulfillment (e.g., from the spot market) in case there is a
shortfall and the generator cannot meet the commitment it
made in Stage 1. In Stage 2, random generation level W
is realized. In case there is a shortfall over the commitment
already made in Stage 1, the auctioneer “de-allocates” some
of the LSEs but pays them a compensation that depends on
the real-time fulfillment costs c. Since the LSEs are strategic
and need not report their values v and costs c truthfully,
we have to devise the allocation, de-allocation and payment
rules such that it leaves no incentive for the LSEs to not be
truthful. Furthermore, we would also like such a mechanism
to be efficient in the sense of maximizing the expected social
welfare even in the absence of knowledge about the true
valuations and costs of the LSEs.
We note that the problem posed here is a two stage
auction mechanism for allocation of a random good with
two part payments. Literature on multi-stage and dynamic
mechanisms is sparse since they are usually regarded as
rather difficult problems. The reader may refer to [8] for the
standard game theoretic terminology that we use throughout
the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Setting
Consider a renewable energy generator with random in-
teger valued generation W ∈ [0, w] where w ∈ Z+ gives
the maximum generation amount. Let p = (p0, . . . , pw) give
the probability mass function for the generator’s output. We
will consider a two stage setting. In stage 1, the generator
conducts an auction to sell the random renewable energy gen-
eration in which N load serving entities (LSEs) participate
and determines an allocation. In stage 2, W is realized, and
say W = k with probability pk. This is known to both the
generator and the LSEs. This may result in a deficit over the
allocation in stage 1, in which case some of the LSEs do not
receive any power but may incur some cost to fulfill demand
from spot market. Denote the value of receiving a unit by vi
and the cost of unfulfilled demand (after allocation in stage
1) by ci for LSE i. Further denote σ = (σ1, . . . σN ), which
is LSE i’s private information.
The generator thus, faces a two-stage stochastic optimiza-
tion problem. In stage 1, it decides out of the various bidding
LSEs, which ones to commit to (the allocation). And once
renewable energy generation W has been realized, if there
is shortfall, in stage 2 it decides which LSEs will receive
energy units, and which one’s will get de-allocated. Let us
denote stage 1 decision by x = x(σ, p) and stage 2 decision
by z = z(x,w). xi = 1 denotes allocation to LSE i in stage
1, and zero otherwise. zi = 1 if LSE i is deallocated in stage
2, and zero otherwise.
Thus given a first stage decision x and realized generation
level W = w, the generator’s second stage decision problem
can be formulated as
min
z
N∑
i=1
(vi + ci)zi (1)
zi ≤ xi ∀ i
N∑
i=1
zi =
(
N∑
i=1
xi − w
)
+
where x+ = max(x, 0). Let Q(x,w;σ) denote the minimum
cost achievable in (1).
Now define the social welfare (SW) achieved when allo-
cation x is chosen and generation level k is realized as
SW (x,w;σ) =
N∑
i=1
vixi −Q(x,w;σ) (2)
The deallocation z depends on shortfall in generation W
which is random. Thus, in stage 1 the generator maximizes
expected social welfare to determine allocation x:
max
x
E[SW (x,W ;σ)] (3)
Note that (3) may also be written
max
x
N∑
i=1
vixi − E[Q(x,w;σ)] (4)
B. Mechanism Design
The generator now holds an auction in which it asks
the various LSEs to submit bids. LSE i submits a bid
σˆi = (vˆi, cˆi) which may be different from its private in-
formation σi = (vi, ci). The generator will use the bids σˆ =
(σˆ1, . . . σˆN ) to make allocation (and deallocation) decisions.
But the allocation can only be expected to be efficient, i.e.,
social welfare maximizing if the bidders truthfully report
σi = (vi, ci). Let γi = vi+ci and similarly γˆi = vˆi+ cˆi. But
bidders are strategic and unless provided proper incentives
need not be truthful. Thus, we would like to design an auction
mechanism that aligns incentives of LSEs such that they
indeed are truthful.
To specify such a mechanism, we need to specify the
allocation rule (based on the bids), the deallocation rule
(based on the bids and the generation realization w) and
the payments to be made. Let I ⊆ N be the subset of
LSEs selected to receive a potential unit of energy. Those
LSEs which are not selected in I leave the auction with zero
payoff. Each selected LSE i makes a payment tdi (σˆ) to the
generator, prior to realization of W . Then in the RT market,
after realization of W , say W = w, a final subset Iw ⊆ I is
selected to receive any available units. Additionally each LSE
i ∈ I receives a payment tri (σˆ, w) from the generator. Both
tri and t
d
i are allowed to take on negative values, indicating
a payment in the reverse direction specified. Together these
selection and payment schemes define a direct revelation
mechanism Γ = (I, Iw, tdi , t
r
i ).
In order to specify the desired properties of such an auction
mechanism it is necessary to first define the payoffs each LSE
will receive. Therefore we define the payoff of LSE i, given
generator decisions (x, z), generation realization w and bids
σˆ as
pii(x, z, w;σ) = vˆixi − (vˆi + cˆi)zi − t
d
i + t
r
i (5)
The first goal in designing our auction mechanism will
be to ensure LSE participation. We assume that this can be
accomplished if no LSE can expect to receive a negative pay-
off, and say that a mechanism achieves individual rationality
(IR) in expectation when:
EW [pii(x, z,W ;σ)] ≥ 0 ∀ i (6)
(6) states that each LSE can expect to receive a nonnega-
tive payoff when participating in the mechanism. Given that
the LSEs choose to participate in the mechanism, it is further
desired that they bid truthfully. This will occur if it is in their
interest to do so, and we say that a mechanism achieves
incentive compatibility (IC) in expectation when:
EW [pii(x, z,W ; (σi, σˆ−i)] ≥ EW [pii(x, z,W ; (σˆi, σˆ−i)]
(7)
for all i and σˆ−i, where σˆ−i = (σˆ1, . . . , σˆi−1, σˆi+1, . . . , σˆN )
gives the bid profile aside from σˆi. (7) states that for each
LSE i, regardless of the bids of the other LSEs, bidding
truthfully yields at least as high an expected value as any
other strategy.
Finally, given that LSEs choose to participate truthfully it
is desired that the auction mechanism makes LSE selections
which maximize the expected social welfare in (3). We
say that an auction mechanism is efficient if it selects an
allocation such that (3) is maximized.
Again, the generator needs to know the valuations and
costs of the LSEs in order to select the best set of LSEs,
in the sense of social welfare maximization. As the LSEs
are strategic, they may not truthfully reveal their valuations
and costs. Thus the goal of this work is to design an auction
mechanism which is individually rational and incentive com-
patible in expectation, as well as efficient. As the mechanism
to be designed is one-sided, we do not attempt to achieve
budget balance.
III. THE GENERATOR’S PROBLEM
Given that our mechanism will be given in the form Γ =
(I, Ik, tdi , t
r
i ), we now give a reformulation of the generator’s
problem. In stage 1, it decides which LSEs to allocate to, and
in stage 2, with knowledge of the generation realization, it
decides which LSEs of those allocated in stage 1, need to be
deselected (and compensated for) when there is a generation
shortfall. Defining x as previously we have that
I = {i : xi = 1} (8)
The number of LSEs selected will be denoted n = |I|.
Let X−i denote the set of allocations for which xi = 0.
Note that functions of x can be considered equivalently as
functions of I, so that occasionally we will interchange them
as arguments. For example Q(x,w;σ) ≡ Q(I, w;σ).
Upon realization of the value ofW , the generator makes a
second stage selection of the final subset of LSEs Iw ⊆ I to
receive the available units, where the subscript w reflects that
W has assumed the value w ∈ {0, 1, . . . , w}. This leaves a
subset Iw = I \ Iw of deselected LSEs. Therefore defining
z as in the previous discussion we have
Iw = {i : zi = 0} (9)
Let N denote the power set of {0, 1, . . . , N}. Let γˆi :=
(vˆi + cˆi). Then the generator’s two stage problem can be
rewritten as
max
I∈N
∑
i∈I
vˆi −
|I|−1∑
w=0
pw min
Iw⊆I


∑
i∈Iw
γˆi : |Iw| = |I| − w


(10)
Note that assuming truthful bids, the inner minimization
problem in (10) is equivalent to (1), and the outer maxi-
mization problem is equivalent (4).
Therefore, in solving (4), the generator determines its
selection I. Given selection I with n = |I|, only when
generation level w < n will the minimum cost in (1) be posi-
tive. Otherwise, each LSE the generator made a commitment
to in stage 1 will receive a unit, yielding Q(x,w; σˆ) = 0.
When the realization w < n, the generator will solve (1), to
determine which LSE are to be deselected with decision z
and associated Iw.
Note that the selection of a particular I induces a ranking
on the selected LSEs. For simplicity assume that the values of
γˆ are unique. Suppose that n = |I| LSEs have been selected
in the first stage, and w < n units are generated. Iw thus,
will include the n−w LSEs selected in I with the lowest γˆi.
This implies that for each LSE i ∈ I there is a maximum
level of generation at which they will not receive a unit.
For example the LSE with rank 1 will not receive a unit
if zero units are generated. The LSE with rank 2 will not
receive a unit if one or fewer units are generated and so
on. If this maximum level is denoted wi for i ∈ I, then let
ri(I) := ri := wi + 1 denote the rank of LSE i for i ∈ I.
We use the notation (·) to indicate indexing with reference
to the selection I. For example the reported valuation of the
LSE with rank 1 under I is denoted vˆ(1). Thus, when |I| = n
γˆ(1) > γˆ(2) > · · · > γˆ(n−1) > γˆ(n) (11)
For j /∈ I let rj := w+1. We will say that LSE (1) occupies
the highest rank and LSE (n) occupies the lowest rank, given
I.
IV. STOCHASTIC VCG MECHANISM FOR SELLING
RANDOM POWER
We introduce a stochastic VCG mechanism for selling
random power. To specify our mechanism Γ we need to
specify selection schemes I and Iw and payment schemes
tdi and t
r
i . The solutions to (4) and (1) give I and Iw. We
now give the payment schemes tri and t
d
i .
First, define LSE i’s utility under allocation x given
production level w as
ui(I, σˆ, w) := ui(σˆ, w) = xi(vi − γi1{w<ri}) (12)
Note that the valuation and cost terms in (12) are the true
values for LSE i, not the reported ones. LSE i’s payoff is
given as
pii(σˆ, w) = ui(σˆ, w)− ti(σˆ, w) (13)
where ti(σˆ, w) = t
d
i (σˆ)− t
r
i (σˆ, w). Taking expectation over
all generation scenarios gives
E[pii(σˆ,W )] = E[ui(σˆ,W )]− E[ti(σˆ,W )] (14)
= E[xi
(
vi − γi1{w<ri}
)
]− E[ti(σˆ,W )]
(15)
= xi
(
vi − γiE[1{w<ri}]
)
− E[ti(σˆ,W )]
(16)
= xi
(
vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
− E[ti(σˆ,W )] (17)
Now, to specify the payment rules tri and t
d
i we need
a couple of additional definitions. First, fixing a first stage
decision I and LSE (i) ∈ I, for j /∈ I, denote
θij :=
(
vˆj − γˆjp0
−
i−1∑
w=1
pw min(γˆ(w), γˆj)−
n−1∑
w=i
pw min(γˆ(w+1), γˆj)
)
(18)
and
j(i) := argmax
j /∈I
θij (19)
where we assume that j(i) is unique.
θij represents the contribution that a particular LSE j /∈ I
would make to the expected social welfare, if it were selected
along with LSEs I\{(i)}. If θij > 0 for at least one LSE j /∈
I, then j(i) is the LSE that is selected if LSE i is disregarded,
forming selection I\{(i)} ∪ {j(i)}. Denote θij(i) := θ
i
, and
similarly vˆj(i) := v
i and γˆj(i) := γ
i.
The motivation for j(i) is as follows. Having fixed I we
will want to determine the externality that LSE (i) imposes
on the generator and other LSEs. This externality will be a
function of the best selection possible given that x(i) = 0,
i.e., the best solution which disregards LSE (i). Denote this
selection I−(i). As will be shown, I−(i) will select all other
LSEs in I, i.e., I\{(i)} as well as up to one additional LSE
j /∈ I, depending upon whether θ
i
> 0. This LSE is j(i).
As described in section III, the selection I−(i) will induce
a ranking on the included LSEs. The notation (·)−(i) will be
used to refer to this ranking. In particular, rj(i)(I
−(i)) := ri
gives the rank of LSE j(i) amongst LSEs I−(i).
The payments td(i) and t
r
(i) for LSE (i) ∈ I will depend
upon θ
i
and ri and are specified in Table I. A positive td(i)
indicates a payment from LSE (i) to the generator in the
DA market, and a positive tr(i) indicates a payment from
the generator to LSE (i) in the RT market. In either case
negative values indicate transfers in the opposite direction.
If LSE j /∈ I then tdj = t
r
j = 0.
TABLE I
PAYMENT FUNCTION FOR LSE (i) ∈ I
Cases td
(i)
(σˆ) tr
(i)
(σˆ, w)
1. θ
i
≤ 0 0
0 0 ≤ w ≤ i− 1
−γˆ(w+1) i ≤ w ≤ n− 1
0 w ≥ n
2.
θ
i
> 0
ri > i
vi
γi 0 ≤ w ≤ i− 1
γi − γˆ(w+1) i ≤ w ≤ r
i − 1
0 ri ≤ w
3. θ
i
> 0
ri ≤ i
vi
γi 0 ≤ w ≤ ri − 1
γˆ(w) r
i ≤ w ≤ i− 1
0 w ≥ i
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−γˆ(4)
−γˆ(5)
−γˆ(6)
w
tr(3)
Fig. 1. Case 1 RT transfer for i = 3 and n = 6.
Case 1: (θ
i
≤ 0) Since θ
i
≤ 0, adding any LSE j /∈ I to
the selection I\{(i)} will not increase the expected social
welfare. Thus LSE (i) does not cause an externality in the
first stage and td(i) = 0. In the second stage, when w ≤ i−1,
LSE (i) is deselected and tr(i) = 0. If i ≤ w ≤ n − 1 then
LSE (i) receives a unit, but there is a shortfall and LSE (i)
pays γˆ(w+1), the sum of value lost and cost incurred by LSE
(w + 1), the “first” deselected LSE. When w ≥ n, LSE (i)
and all other selected LSEs receive a unit and tr(i) = 0.
Case 2: (θ
i
> 0, ri > i ) θ
i
> 0 indicates that if LSE (i)
were not present then some other LSE j /∈ I could be added
to the selection I\{(i)} to increase the expected SW. In
particular LSE j(i) could be added to maximize this increase,
so in the DA market LSE i pays td(i) = v
i, the value term
that LSE j(i) would have added to the expected SW.
If w ≤ i − 1, then LSE (i) does not receive a unit, but
received compensation γi. If i ≤ w ≤ ri − 1 then LSE (i)
receives a unit, but makes a payment of tr(i) = γ
i − γˆ(w+1).
To see that this difference is nonpositive observe that given
w ∈ [i, ri−1], since γˆ(j) is increasing in j, γˆ(w+1) ≥ γˆ(ri) ≥
γi. The last inequality here follows from the assumption ri ≤
i− 1, which implies that LSE (i+1) has rank i in selection
I\{(i)} ∪ j(i), i.e. r(i+1)(I
−i) = i > ri.
If w ≥ ri, then tr(i) = 0. This is because while LSE (i) is
omitted, they are replaced by LSE j(i), so that all LSEs with
rank higher than ri in selection I will have the same rank
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
γi
γi − γˆ(4)
w
tr(3)
Fig. 2. Case 2 RT transfer for i = 3, n = 6 and r3 = 4.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
γi
γˆ(2)
w
tr(3)
Fig. 3. Case 3 RT transfer for i = 3, n = 6 and r3 = 2.
in selection I−(i). Therefore the presence of LSE (i) in the
RT market does not affect whether or not they experience
shortfall, i.e. LSE (i) imposes no externality on them.
Case 3: (θ
i
> 0, ri ≤ i ) The scheme and explanation for
td(i) in this case is the same as in the previous case.
When 0 ≤ w ≤ ri − 1 < i, LSE (i) receives no unit, but
they are compensated with a payment tr(i) = γ
i. Alternatively
this may be interpreted as LSE i receiving a credit of γi,
as their presence prevents the selection of LSE j(i), and
therefore the loss of γi when w < ri.
If ri ≤ w ≤ i − 1, then LSE (i) again receives no unit
and is compensated with tr(i) = γˆ(w). Again this can be
interpreted in terms of hypothetical loss. Since w ≥ ri, LSE
j(i) would receive a unit. Since ri ≤ i, LSE j(i) would
force LSEs (ri) through (i − 1) to one higher rank, i.e.,
r(k)(I
−i) = k + 1 for ri ≤ k ≤ i − 1. Therefore, if ri ≤
w ≤ i−1, LSE (w) would be the “first” LSE to be deselected
under I−i, and so LSE (i) imposes a positive externality of
γˆ(w).
Finally, if w ≥ i then LSE (i) receives a unit and tr(i) = 0.
In this case, no RT transfer occurs between LSE (i) and the
generator because as in Case 2, LSE (i) is omitted and then
replaced in I−i, with ri < i. Therefore, the rank of LSEs
(i + 1) through (n) does not change, and the presence of
LSE (i) imposes no externality on them.
Note that for the case where ri = i, the payments given
by the last two rows of Table 1 agree, i.e., either scheme
may be used. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 1: Let vˆ1 = 3, vˆ2 = 2 and vˆ3 = 13/32, and
γˆ1 = 2, γˆ2 = 1 and γˆ3 = 1/2. Assume that the generation
distribution is given by p = (1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/8). Then I =
{1, 2}, and LSE 1 has rank 1 and LSE 2 has rank 2. To see
why this selection is optimal, observe that if LSE 3 were also
selected, then since γˆ3 < γˆ2 < γˆ1, in the scenarios where
w ∈ {0, 1, 2}, they would be deselected. That is I0 = ∅,
I1 = {1}, I2 = {1, 2} and I3 = {1, 2, 3}. Therefore, their
expected contribution to social welfare would be given by
vˆ3 − γˆ3(p0 + p1 + p2) = 13/32− (1/2)(7/8) < 0, (20)
while LSE 2 contributes
vˆ2 − γˆ2(p0 + p1) = 2− 1(3/4) > 0, (21)
and LSE 1 contributes
vˆ1 − γˆ1p0 = 3− (2)(1/2) > 0. (22)
However if either LSE 1 or 2 were not selected, and LSE
3 were selected, then it would achieve rank 2 and make a
contribution of
θ
1
= θ
2
= vˆ3 − γˆ3(p0 + p1) = 13/32− (1/2)(3/4) > 0.
(23)
to the expected social welfare. Thus LSE 1 and LSE 2 fall
under case 2 and 3, respectively, of Table I, and their DA
payments are
td1 = t
d
2 = 13/32. (24)
For LSE 1 tr1(σˆ, 0) = 1/2, t
r
1(σˆ, 1) = 1/2− 1 = −1/2 and
tr1(σˆ, w) = 0 for w ≥ 2. For LSE 2, t
r
2(0) = t
r
2(1) = 1/2,
and tr2(w) = 0 for w ≥ 2. 
We call the mechanism consisting of selection scheme (8),
deselection scheme (9) and payments listed in Table 1 for
i ∈ I and tdi := 0, t
r
i := 0 for i /∈ I a Stochastic VCG
Mechanism for Random goods (SVCG-RANDOM).
Theorem 1: The SVCG-RANDOM mechanism is individu-
ally rational and incentive compatible in expectation, as well
as efficient.
This appears to be the first two stage mechanism for
random goods such as renewable energy. While we focus
on LSEs wanting single units, it can be extended to multi-
unit domain and bids. IR and IC properties are achieved in
expectation ex ante. Ex post IR and IC are unlikely to be
achievable.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Subsection B of this section presents a proof of the
claimed mechanism properties in each of the three cases
listed in Table I. The proof relies on a lemma, from subsec-
tion A, concerning the optimal selection that the generator
makes when x(i) = 0, denoted I
−(i).
A. The Selection I−(i)
In order to show that the proposed selection and payment
schemes constitute a mechanism achieving the properties
stated in Theorem 1, an explicit form of I−(i) for (i) ∈ I
is needed. Below, Lemma 2 enumerates the possible forms
of I−(i), as well as conditions for when each form applies.
Lemma 1 is necessary in the proof of Lemma 2. Proofs of
both may be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1: For any LSE j /∈ I with n = |I|
vˆj − γˆjp0 ≤
n∑
w=1
min(γˆj , γˆ(w))pw ≤ γˆj
n∑
w=1
pw (25)
Lemma 2: For (i) ∈ I, the optimal selection given x(i) =
0, I−(i), is
I−(i) =
{
I\{(i)} if θ
i
≤ 0
I\{(i)} ∪ {j(i)} if θ
i
> 0
(26)
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Let x−i denote the first stage allocation corresponding to
the solution of (10) when xi = 0. Let r
−i
j give the ranking
of LSE j under selection x−i, and V −i denote the maximum
expected SW achieved when xi = 0, given bids σˆ.
For some LSE i, fix σˆ−i, the bids of the other LSEs, and
assume that LSE i bids truthfully, so that the bid vector is
σˆ = (σi, σˆ−i). Also assume that given this σˆ, the generator
makes selection I with n = |I|, and that LSE i ∈ I with
rank i, so that in this context (i) = i. Let V ∗ be the optimal
expected SW associated with selection I.
Case 1: (θ
i
≤ 0) Since LSE i ∈ I, xi = 1 and
E[pii(I,W ; σˆ)] = vi − γiE[1{W<i}]− t
d
i + E[t
r
i (W )]
= vi − γi
i−1∑
w=0
pw −
n−1∑
w=i
γˆ(w+1)pw
= vi − γi
i−1∑
w=0
pw +

∑
i6=j
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)

−

∑
i6=j
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
n−1∑
w=i
γˆ(w+1)pw


(27)
= vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw +

∑
i6=j
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
−

∑
j≤n
j 6=i
(
vˆ(j) − γˆ(j)
j−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
n−1∑
w=i
γˆ(w+1)pw


(28)
=xi
(
vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
∑
i6=j
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
− V −i
(29)
= V ∗ − V −i ≥ 0, (30)
where the second to last equality holds due to Lemma 2,
and the last holds due to σˆ = (σi, σˆ−i). Note that the first
line of (29) changes with σˆi only via r and x. If LSE i bids
truthfully, then the generator will choose the x and r which
maximize these terms. Given some σˆi 6= σi, the generator
will make a different selection, which can only decrease
these terms. Therefore truthful bidding is a weakly dominant
strategy which also ensures a nonnegative expected payoff
for LSE (i). Thus for Case 1 and LSE i ∈ I the mechanism
is IC and IR in expectation.
Case 2: (θ
i
< 0, ri > i)
E[pii(I,W ; σˆ)] = vi − γiE[1{W<i}]− t
d
i + E[t
r
i (W )]
= vi − γi
i−1∑
w=0
pw − v
i + γi
i−1∑
w=0
pw +
ri−1∑
w=i
(γi − γˆ(w+1))pw
(31)
= xi
(
vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
∑
j 6=i
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
−
[∑
j≤n
j 6=i
(
vˆ(j) − γˆ(j)
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
ri−1∑
w=i
γˆ(w+1)pw
+ vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
]
(32)
= xi
(
vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
∑
j 6=i
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
−
[∑
j≤n
j 6=i
(
vˆ(j) − γˆ(j)
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
ri−1∑
w=i
γˆ(w+1)pw + θ
i
]
(33)
= xi
(
vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
∑
j 6=i
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
− V −i
= V ∗ − V −i ≥ 0.
(34)
Again the second to last equality holds due to Lemma 2.
By the same argument as for Case 1, LSE i’s expected payoff
is maximized when they bid truthfully, and this maximized
expected payoff is nonnegative. Thus for Case 3 and LSE
i ∈ I the mechanism is IC and IR in expectation.
Case 3: (θ
i
< 0, ri ≤ i)
E[pii(I,W ; σˆ)] = vi − γiE[1{W<i}]− t
d
i + E[t
r
i (W )]
= vi − γi
i−1∑
w=0
pw − v
i + γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw +
i−1∑
w=ri
γˆ(w)pw
(35)
= xi
(
vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
∑
j 6=i
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
−
[∑
j≤n
j 6=i
(
vˆ(j) − γˆ(j)
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
i−1∑
w=ri
γˆ(w)pw
+ vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
]
(36)
= xi
(
vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
∑
j 6=i
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
−
[∑
j≤n
j 6=i
(
vˆ(j) − γˆ(j)
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
i−1∑
w=ri
γˆ(w)pw + θ
i
]
(37)
= xi
(
vi − γi
ri−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+
∑
j 6=i
xj
(
vˆj − γˆj
rj−1∑
w=0
pw
)
− V −i
= V ∗ − V −i ≥ 0.
Here, as in Case 1 and Case 2 the last equality is due
to Lemma 2. Again bidding truthfully maximizes LSE i’s
expected payoff, and this expected payoff is nonnegative.
Therefore in all cases, the mechanism is incentive compatible
and individually rational in expectation for LSEs i ∈ I.
Before moving to the situation for an LSE j /∈ I, observe
that in each case presented thus far, the expected payment
made by LSE i ∈ I has been shown to be the difference
between the expected SW enjoyed by LSEs j 6= i when
LSE i is or is not considered in the generator’s selection. In
fact, omitting the expectation from the preceding calculations
shows that given any σˆ−i and generation realization w, the
payment made by LSE i is equal to the externality imposed
on the other LSEs. This is the key to the IC and IR in
expectation properties just demonstrated for LSEs i ∈ I.
Considering an LSE j /∈ I, trj = t
d
j = 0. Again, here
it can be seen that since V −j = V ∗, LSE j imposes zero
externality, so that they too make an overall payment equal
to their associated externality. Therefore the mechanism is
IC and IR in expectation (see [4], [7]).
Therefore in all cases, regardless of whether LSE i is
selected in I, truthful bidding is a weakly dominant strategy
in expectation which achieves nonnegative expected payoff.
This shows that the mechanism achieves incentive compat-
ibility and individual rationality in expectation. Given that
all LSEs are incentivized to bid truthfully, we can assume
that the generator makes its selections and deselections with
the true LSE information σ, so that selection and deselection
schemes (8) and (9) are efficient. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we propose a two-stage mechanism for the
sale of stochastic power. While our mechanism is shown to
be incentive compatible and individual rational in expecta-
tion, we also demonstrate that for specific generation sce-
narios it is possible to give explicit descriptions of payments
for both stages. Further, the component day ahead and real
time payments have natural interpretations, e.g., credit or
compensation for shortfall averted or incurred, respectively.
In the future, we will incorporate grid transmission con-
straints in order to make our setting more realistic. Also
we will explore how to bring together existing one sided
mechanisms for buying stochastic power with the one pre-
sented here in order to form two sided exchanges serving
both generators and LSEs.
This work, as well as the proposed future work has the
potential to facilitate wider adoption of renewables into smart
grid networks.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: Since I is the optimal selection, it must be true
that adding any other LSE j /∈ I would decrease the expected
SW achieved. Let V ′ be the expected social welfare achieved
when LSE j is added to I. Then
0 ≥ V ′ − V ∗ = vˆj − γˆjp0 −
n∑
w=1
min(γˆj , γˆ(w))pw (38)
The first two terms on the far right represent the value LSE j
would contribute, and additional cost incurred if no units are
produced. The min terms in the sum express that given w
units are produced, whether LSE (w) would still be the “last”
LSE to receive a unit as under selection I, or if instead LSE
j would receive the unit. The LSE with the larger γˆ value
receives the unit.
The last inequality in Lemma 1 shows that in fact no
selection should include more than n − 1 LSEs which are
not in I, because those with rank n− 1+ k with k > 0 will
make expected SW contribution
vˆ(n−1+k)′ − γˆ(n−1+k)′
n−1+k∑
w=0
pw ≤
vˆ(n−1+k)′ − γˆ(n−1+k)′
n∑
w=0
pw ≤ 0
(39)
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: Starting with the selection I, since xi = 1 if,
and only if i ∈ I, the expected SW achieved by I is
E[SW (I,W ; σˆ)] =
n∑
i=1
(
vˆ(i) − γˆ(i)
i−1∑
w=0
pw
)
= V ∗ (40)
Consider another selection I˜ which simply swaps LSE (i)
for another LSE j /∈ I, keeping LSE j in rank i. Note that
this may be suboptimal, even amongst all selections which
include I\{(i)} ∪ {j}. The expected SW achieved by I˜ is
∑
k≤n
k 6=i
(
vˆ(k) − γˆ(k)
k−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+ vˆj − γˆj
i−1∑
w=0
pw ≤ V
∗ (41)
In particular, subtracting the first sum from both sides of (41)
and using (40) gives
vˆj − γˆj
i−1∑
w=0
pw ≤ vˆ(i) − γˆ(i)
i−1∑
w=0
pw (42)
Note that (42) holds for any i ≤ n and j /∈ I.
(42) shows that an arbitrary selection I ′ with |I ′| = n+m
and m > 1, and I ∩I ′ = ∅, can be improved by substituting
LSEs I\{(i)} for the n−1 LSEs in I ′ with the corresponding
ranks. Associating with I ′ allocation x′ and rankings r′,
denoted (·)′, yields
E[SW (I ′,W ; σˆ)] =
n′∑
j=1
(
vˆ(j)′ − γˆ(j)′
j−1∑
w=0
pw
)
(43)
≤
∑
j≤n
j 6=i
(
vˆ(j) − γˆ(j)
j−1∑
w=0
pw
)
+ vˆ(i)′ − γˆ(i)′
i−1∑
w=0
pw
+
n+m∑
j=n+1
(
vˆ(j)′ − γˆ(j)′
j−1∑
w=0
pw
)
(44)
(44) contains contributions from LSEs from I\{(i)} as
well as I ′. As written, (44) assumes they are ranked in order
(top to bottom rank)
(1), . . . , (i− 1), (i)′, (i+1), . . . , (n), (n+1)′, . . . , (n+m)′
(45)
This ordering may not agree with the optimal order corre-
sponding to the LSEs γˆ values. Without listing the γˆ values
in order, it is still possible to determine the contribution an
LSE j ∈ {(n + 1)′, . . . , (n + m)′} ⊂ I ′ would make to
the expected SW once the LSEs are ranked according to γˆ
values via the following expression. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then
this contribution is
vˆ(n+k)′ − γˆ(n+k)′
k∑
w=0
pw −
k+i−1∑
w=k+1
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w−k))pw
−
k+n−1∑
w=k+i
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w−k+1))pw
(46)
The first two terms in (46) reflect the value that vˆ(n+k)′ adds,
along with the potential cost due to their relative ranking
amongst LSEs {(i)′, (n+1)′, . . . , (n+m)′}. The second two
sums compare LSE (n+ k)′ with the LSEs from I\{(i)} in
order to determine, for each generation level k < w ≤ k+n,
which would receive a unit. Continuing,
(46) ≤ vˆ(n+k)′ − γˆ(n+k)′p0 −
k∑
w=1
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w))pw
−
k+i−1∑
w=k+1
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w−k))pw
−
k+n−1∑
w=k+i
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w−k+1))pw
(47)
and here using that when k ≥ 1, γˆ(w) < γˆ(w−k+1) < γˆ(w−k)
≤ vˆ(n+k)′ − γˆ(n+k)′p0 −
k∑
w=1
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w))pw
−
k+i−1∑
w=k+1
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w))pw
−
n∑
w=k+i
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w))pw
(48)
≤ vˆ(n+k)′ − γˆ(n+k)′p0 −
n∑
w=1
min(γˆ(n+k)′ , γˆ(w))pw
≤ 0
(49)
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1. Therefore
when the full set of LSEs included in (44) are ranked accord-
ing to γˆ values in order to maximize expected social welfare,
LSEs {(n+ 1)′, . . . , (n+m)′} will actually make negative
contributions, and therefore may be discarded. Aside from
LSEs I\{(i)} this leaves only (i)′, which makes an expected
social welfare contribution of
vˆ(i)′ − γˆ(i)′p0 −
i−1∑
w=1
min(γˆ(i)′ , γˆ(w))pw
−
n−1∑
w=i
min(γˆ(i)′ , γˆ(w+1))pw
(50)
Note that this is precisely θij as defined in (18) for j =
(i)′. The optimal LSE j /∈ I to add, then, is the one
which maximizes θij . Thus the optimal selection, I
−(i) which
ignores LSE (i) will select I\{(i)} when θ
i
≤ 0 and
I\{(i)} ∪ {j(i)} when θ
i
> 0.
